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Abstract 
 
 In bargaining environments with uncertain disagreement or “impasse” outcomes 
(e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that 
confounds data interpretation.  Specifically, the minimally acceptable settlement value 
from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased-belief bargainer is empirically 
indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimistically 
(optimistically) biased beliefs.  This paper reports results from a controlled bargaining 
experiment where data on both risk attitude and beliefs under uncertainty are generated in 
order to assess their relative importance in bargaining experiment outcomes.  The average 
lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic with respect to uncertainty, which is consistent 
with existing studies that examine each in isolation.  I also find that the effects of 
optimism dominate those of risk-aversion.  Optimistic bargainers are significantly more 
likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions.  Dispute rates are not 
statistically affected by risk attitude, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to 
a weakened bargaining position.  Though additional research is needed to understand the 
limits of extending these results, a key implication follows.  In uncertainty environments 
where optimism dominates, increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by 
minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than 
maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as 
has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.   
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1.  Introduction 
 Theoretical research on bargaining has produced a well-known result that risk 
aversion will harm an individual’s bargaining position, ceteris paribus.  This result has 
been shown in a variety of game-theoretic models, including the highly influential 
models in Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982).1  Analysis of bargainer decision-making 
under uncertainty, such as in Farber and Katz (1979), produces a similar result in the 
sense that risk aversion in an expected utility framework lowers a bargainer’s threat point 
(or certainty equivalent for the lottery).   Laboratory data generally confirms the 
theoretical prediction that risk aversion harms bargaining outcomes, although estimated 
risk aversion effects are sometimes weak or dominated by other features of the 
bargaining situation, such as focal points or explicit disagreement costs (see Murnighan 
et al., 1988, Farber et al., 1990).   
A separate strand of literature examines the effects of biased beliefs on bargaining 
outcomes under uncertainty.  Though there exists evidence of pessimism in some 
environments (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Clark and Friesen, 2005), a good deal of 
research in psychology and economics has documented decision-maker overconfidence 
or belief-optimism in a variety of settings.2  Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) argue that 
many results from laboratory and field evidence on bargaining impasse (i.e., 
disagreement) are consistent with the notion that bargainers are overconfident or possess 
a self-serving bias in negotiations.  Though such optimism may take more than one 
form—optimism about relative bargaining skills versus optimism about the likely 
                                                 
1 This result does not hold only in the event that agreement outcomes are lotteries, as shown in Roth and 
Rothblum (1982). 
2 In general, both optimism and pessimism should be a concern.  Context or framing is likely a determining 
factor—overestimating the odds of an uncertain but rare event, for example, may be considered pessimistic 
(acquiring food-borne illness) or optimistic (winning the lottery). 
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decision rendered by a judge or arbitrator—this paper is specifically concerned with the 
optimistic belief that bargainers have over the uncertain outcome from impasse.  
Litigants, for example, are likely to have uncertainty about the final payoffs of going to 
trial versus settling out-of-court.  There is also uncertainty surrounding disputed 
outcomes when they are settled through arbitration, which is increasingly used as a 
replacement for litigation for many civil disputes.  If a labor union chooses to strike (i.e., 
dispute) rather than agree to management’s contract offer, then the ultimate payoff 
outcome is typically not known with certainty by either management or the union.  In 
general, one could consider that these environments all involve uncertainty or 
“ambiguous” lotteries (see Ellsberg, 1961), where probabilities over outcomes are 
unknown due to missing information. 
It has been shown in an expected utility framework that the bargainers’ contract 
zone—the region of outcomes mutually preferred to dispute—may theoretically disappear 
if bargainers are optimistic about the likely outcome from the impasse lottery (see 
framework in Farber and Katz, 1979).  Both field and laboratory evidence indicate higher 
dispute rates when optimism is present (e.g., Neale and Bazerman, 1985; Farber et al., 
1990; Babcock et al., 1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Farmer et al, 2004; 
Dickinson, 2006).  However, risk attitudes are not measured in these studies, and 
therefore represent a confound in the data interpretation.3 
The theoretical effects of belief optimism work opposite the effects of risk 
aversion in terms of a bargainer’s threat point or reservation value—the negotiated 
outcome that provides the same utility as playing the impasse lottery (i.e., the certainty 
                                                 
3 Neale and Bazerman (1985) use a framing manipulation (gains v. losses) and assume risk attitude based 
on the frame of the negotiations.   
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equivalent).4  This has important implications because the behavioral outcomes from a 
risk-averse individual who has optimistic beliefs can be observationally equivalent to 
those from a risk-neutral yet unbiased bargainer.  In other words, the independent effects 
of risk attitude in the data cannot typically be identified unless one measures beliefs as 
well.  A method is proposed in Wakker (2004) (utilized in Abdellaoui et al, 2005) for 
abstract individual decision-making environments, but is not appropriate for the present 
bargaining study.  An example of this identification problem in bargaining experiment 
similar to the present one is found in Ashenfelter et al. (1992).  Their data on final offers 
are said to be consistent with risk aversion, because bargainers demand less of the pie 
than predicted by risk neutrality when impasse outcomes are uncertain.  However, 
observationally equivalent data could be generated by risk-neutral subjects who are 
pessimistic about the likely outcomes from impasse.5 
 Existing bargaining research has examined both risk attitude and beliefs in 
isolation, while the decision theory literature has recently developed methods for 
decomposing risk preference and beliefs (Wakker, 2004).  To this author’s knowledge, 
there is no previous bargaining study eliciting subjects’ home-grown preferences for risk 
and subject beliefs over uncertain impasse outcomes.  Neale and Bazerman (1985) 
address both optimism and risk preferences in a mock negotiations experiment.  
However, they do not directly measure risk attitudes.  Farber et al. (1990) examines the 
effects of risk aversion in a mock negotiations exercise in which bargainers are 
                                                 
4 The theoretical framework in Farber and Katz (1979)—presented in Section 2—utilizes the concepts of 
certainty equivalents and contract zones to analyze the likelihood of dispute.  For related work on the issues 
of dispute and outcome uncertainty, see Shavell (1982) and Priest and Klein (1982). 
5 Alternatively, if the Ashenfelter et al. (1992) subjects are, on average, risk-averse and optimistic, then 
results consistent with risk aversion may indicate that subject risk aversion dominates the subjects’ 
optimism.  The precise contribution of each factor is nonetheless unidentified. 
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optimistic, but both risk aversion and optimism are induced in their research.  The 
contribution of the present research is to use a two-stage experiment to first elicit 
subjects’ risk attitude, and then conduct a second-stage bargaining experiment with 
uncertainty where subject beliefs are elicited.6  Because mock negotiations run the risk of 
introducing confounds into the data generation, I choose a more abstract bargaining 
experiment to limit potential confounds.7  Also, though risk attitude and/or beliefs may be 
sensitive to context or scale of payoffs, other controlled laboratory studies implement 
outcome uncertainty like the type examined in the present paper (e.g., Ashenfelter et al., 
1992; Charness, 2000; Dickinson, 2004, 2006; Deck and Farmer, forthcoming).  So, 
optimism (i.e., beliefs) may be an unidentified confound in some of the existing 
experimental bargaining research, and this paper hopes to contribute to our understanding 
of the likely impact of optimism relative to risk attitude in such data.  Future research can 
help clarify the robustness of the present results in other environments. 
The present data show that the average subject is risk-averse yet optimistic, 
consistent with previous research that has examined each separately.  Optimism has a 
strong effect on increasing the likelihood of dispute, though it may improve one’s 
outcome in a voluntarily negotiated settlement by making final bargaining positions more 
aggressive.  Risk aversion does not have a statistically significant effect on dispute rates, 
but there is some evidence that it harms one’s outcome in a negotiated settlement, as 
                                                 
6 The reader will note that, though I assume an expected utility framework in generating testable 
hypotheses, the stage-one experiment allows one to control for risk attitude independent of the theoretical 
framework. 
7 Roth (1995) describes the concern with face-to-face context-laden experiments.  While such experiments 
have clear value in bargaining research, there may be problems in interpreting their data.  The issue is that 
these less-controlled face-to-face bargaining experiments introduce confounds into the data that are not 
easily quantifiable.  In the end, this makes it more difficult to properly identify the desired treatment effects 
of an experiment.  Of course, the trade-off is that more abstract experiments are less externally valid (i.e., 
less realistic).  This explains why experiments in less controlled, but more realistic, environments are 
necessary to test the bounds or robustness of any theory. 
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predicted by theory.  Overall, the lab evidence indicates that the effects of belief-
optimism behaviorally dominate the effects of risk attitude in this setting.  This is an 
important result for laboratory research on decision-making under uncertainty, because it 
highlights an important confound that may affect data interpretation when one is not 
careful to create well-known (i.e., pure risk) lotteries in the lab.  If these results can be 
extended to naturally occurring bargaining situations where there is uncertainty 
surrounding the impasse outcome, these results have important implications on 
institutional design of dispute resolution procedures.  If, as is likely the case, bargaining 
is an environment of uncertainty, then reduced dispute rates—a commonly used measure 
of bargaining or settlement procedure success—are more likely achieved by minimizing 
impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing 
uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been 
argued in the existing literature (see Stevens, 1966). 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
 Some specific hypotheses about the effects of risk attitude and beliefs are derived 
from the expected utility framework used in Farber and Katz (1979), on which the 
experimental design is roughly based.  Specifically, consider a B (buyer) and S (seller) 
engaged in zero-sum bargaining over one dollar (or any fixed amount of money).  
Bargainer utility is defined as : 
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where x is the fraction of the pie player S receives, and z=1-x is the amount that player B 
receives.  With these parameterizations utility increases in the fraction of the pie 
received, with U(0)=0 and U(1)=1.  Risk preferences are defined solely by ci for i=b,s, 
where -ci is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.  As such, player i is risk-
averse (loving) when ci < (>) 0.  The buyer and seller have beliefs, zb~N(zbF, b2) and 
xs~N(xsF, s2), respectively, of what the impasse outcome would be for themselves. 
Farber and Katz indicate that this framework is in contrast to one that distinguishes 
between risk and uncertainty, although it is clear that it allows for uncertainty belief bias 
rather than introducing pure risk.8 
 Farber and Katz (1979) derive the bargainers’ certainty equivalents or reservation 
values, Xi,R for i=s,b:  the lowest (highest) amount the seller (buyer) would be willing to 
accept (give) in a negotiated settlement.  For the seller they show this to be 
Xs,R=xsF+(1/2)s2cs.  Assuming that a bargainer is willing to accept any negotiated 
settlement providing a greater share of the pie then his reservation value, the seller is 
therefore willing to discount his lowest acceptable negotiated settlement if risk-averse,  
cs<0, and/or pessimistic, sF
pess
s xx  .  The opposite is true if the seller is risk-loving 
and/or optimistic.  The buyer’s reservation value is given by Zb,R=zbF + (1/2)b2cb.  The 
buyer similarly discounts his reservation value if risk-averse and/or pessimistic.  
Alternatively, one could write the buyer’s reservation value in terms of the maximum the 
buyer is willing to give the seller in a negotiated settlement, Xb,R=xbF - (1/2)2cb, where 
                                                 
8 Several non-expected utility frameworks assume decision-weight distortions in pure risk environments, 
such that risk attitude is simultaneously determined by both utility function curvature and probabilistic 
weighting (see Yaari, 1987, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Chateauneuf and Cohen, 1994; and Wakker, 
1994 for examples).  The optimism discussed in the present paper is not probabilistic optimism, and only in 
the present expected utility model can one interpret utility function curvature, ci, as the sole indicator of risk 
attitude. 
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xbF=1-zbF is the buyer’s expectation of what the impasse outcome would provide to the 
seller.  Assuming a common b2=s2=2 for simplicity (i.e., optimism is with respect to 
average outcomes, not outcome variance), Farber and Katz show that the contract zone, 
, of mutually beneficial bargaining outcomes is given by  
(1) 
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 Equation (1) highlights the predicted effects of optimism and risk preferences on 
bargaining outcomes.  A necessary condition for a positive contract zone, which I assume 
to be a measure of the likelihood of a settlement, is to either have average bargainer 
pessimism with respect to uncertain outcomes (xbF-xsF>0) or average bargainer risk 
aversion (cb+cs<0).  Sufficient conditions also include the cases where risk-aversion 
dominates optimism, or where pessimism dominates any risk-loving preferences.  
Similarly, necessary conditions for no contract zone are optimism and/or risk-loving 
behavior.  A more complicated noncooperative bargaining framework could be utilized, 
but it is noted in the introduction that these stylized results are common across numerous 
frameworks in the literature.   
It should also be noted that this framework generates comparative static 
predictions on dispute rates and bargainer reservation values.  Specifically, optimism 
increases reservation values, which I assume will lead to more aggressive final 
bargaining positions.  Risk aversion not only moderates reservation values, but the extent 
to which it does is an increasing function of the uncertainty:    021 2 


s
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c
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similarly for the buyer.  It is this result that leads to the familiar prediction that risk 
aversion harms one’s bargaining position, ceteris paribus.  Assuming that the contract 
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zone is a predictor of dispute rates, belief-optimism is predicted to increase dispute rates, 
but an increase in a bargainer’s level of risk aversion is predicted to decrease dispute 
rates to an extent that depends on the perceived impasse uncertainty, 

3.  The Experiment
 Subjects participate in a two-stage experiment.  In the first stage, subjects 
complete the lottery-choice experiment described in Holt and Laury (2002).  Subjects 
face ten pairs of lotteries, and for each pair must state a preference for the safe or the 
risky lottery option.  The total number of safe versus risky options chosen is used to 
generate a risk attitude variable, which is independent of any potential probability 
weighting.  In other words, risk preference is captured in the first stage experiment, and 
will serve to remove the risk attitude confound from evaluating uncertainty beliefs in the 
stage-two experiment.  Payoff amounts in the Holt and Laury low-payoff experiment are 
multiplied by two, which meant that the “safe” options had high/low payoffs of 
$4.00/$3.20, while the “risky” options all had high/low payoffs of $7.70/$.20.  Each of 
the ten pairs of lottery choices asks for the subject’s preference of playing the Option A 
lottery (the safe gamble) or the Option B lottery (the risky gamble).  The ten paired 
Option A/Option B choices differ by systematically varying the odds of winning the high 
(low) payoff amount from odds of 1/10 (9/10) to 10/10 (0/10).  Subjects must state an 
option preference (or indifference) for each of the ten paired options, but only one will be 
                                                 
9 There is some debate in the literature over the link between dispute rates and the size of the contract zone.  
Some argue that larger contract zones imply lower dispute rates (e.g., Crawford, 1982; Farber and 
Bazerman, 1987), but an alternative view is that larger contract zones imply more over which to dispute, 
thereby increasing dispute rates (e.g., Tracy, 1986; Crampton, 1992).  The weight of the laboratory 
evidence is that optimism or decreased outcome uncertainty leads to higher dispute rates (e.g., Ashenfelter 
et al, 1992; Dickinson, 2006), and so we assume that smaller contract zones imply more likely dispute in 
the present paper.  
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randomly selected for payoff at the end of the experiment.  At the end of the experiment, 
a paired option is randomly selected for each subject individually, and the subject’s 
preferred option choice is played out using a 10-sided die.  Finalization of the first-stage 
lottery-choice experiment is deferred to the end of the experiment to limit wealth effects 
across experiment stages.  Subjects are also made aware that their decisions from stage 
one do not affect earnings in stage two of the experiment, and vice-versa. 
 The second-stage experiment is the main bargaining experiment, and treatments 
that have uncertain impasse outcomes can be thought of as “arbitration” treatment.  The 
experimental environment was designed to test a zero-sum bargaining framework similar 
to that of Farber and Katz (1979).  Subjects were randomly assigned as buyer or seller 
(called Player “A” or “B”, respectively, in the experiment) in a zero-sum bargaining 
experiment.  It is common knowledge that subjects bargain with the same anonymous 
counterpart for the entire 15-round experiment.  The players bargain over the variable X, 
and the buyer (seller) has a payoff table that shows cash payoffs per round are decreasing 
(increasing) in the level of X.  Players are only aware of their own payoff Table, which 
showed payoffs ranging from $0 to $2.50, depending on the level of X.  In order to limit 
the possibility of a focal point at half the pie, the buyer was given a suggested bargaining 
range for X of [200,700] and a payoff tables based on the payoff function 
Pb($)=1.00+(500-x)(.005).  Similarly, the seller was suggested a range of [300,800], and 
a payoff based on the function Ps($)=1.00+(x-500)(.005).  So, the “pie” is actually $2.00 
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per round and would be split at X=500, though this was not the center of either Player’s 
suggested bargaining range.10   
This use of asymmetric bargaining ranges is meant to simulate incomplete 
information concerning the counterpart’s bargaining range—this improves the external 
validity of the environment.  Though there may be concern that this design feature creates 
asymmetric information that may be confused with the effects of asymmetric beliefs, it 
should be noted that the information structure remains constant across all rounds and all 
treatments. While asymmetric information may then contribute to higher overall dispute 
rates, which are accounted for in the data estimation procedure as a pair-specific effects, 
it should not be a cause of differences across experimental treatments.11 
 Players participated in three distinct experimental treatments of 5 rounds each, 
which was unknown to the subjects, a priori.  Each bargaining round is two minutes in 
length.  If subjects reach the end of the round without having mutually agreed on a value 
of X, they are prompted to submit their “final offers”, xb and xs, for X.  If final offers 
converge or criss-cross (i.e., xb ≥ xs) then the value of X for the round is the average of 
the final offers—a last-minute settlement.  If final offers fail to converge—what I will 
refer to as disagreement or dispute—then the dispute settlement process differs by 
treatment.  In the NA (no arbitration) treatment, subjects both earn a zero payoff in the 
                                                 
10 Player payoffs were not truncated at zero in the experimental application either.  For example, if the 
buyer agreed to a seller proposal of X=800, then the buyer’s earnings for the round would be negative, 
though negative earnings occur in less than 2% of the data. 
11 Some additional experiments were conducted that utilized the more structured ultimatum game (Guth et 
al., 1982), which is well-known in the experimental economics literature.  Because the bargaining range is 
necessarily identical for both bargainers in the ultimatum game (i.e., players bargain for anywhere from all 
to none of a pie of known size), it is of interest that beliefs in a modified ultimatum game—one that utilized 
a random decision procedure at impasse—were unbiased.  This may indicate that a portion of the optimism 
in the present unstructured bargaining experiments results from the asymmetric suggested bargaining 
ranges.  At best, this would only partially explain optimism, because the results in Section 4 show that 
optimism increases in the higher variance CA treatment discussed in this Section, even though suggested 
bargaining ranges remain unchanged.  These ultimatum results are available on request. 
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event of dispute.  In the other two treatments, a computerized random number generator 
determines the value of X for the round.  The random X selection process is used to 
simulate the uncertainty surrounding the payoff outcome is dispute occurs, which may 
simulate the uncertainty of arbitration, litigation, continued dispute, termination of the 
bargaining relationship, etc.  I refer to these two treatments as CA treatments (CA for 
Conventional Arbitration), and it is clear that the “cost” of these dispute settlement 
procedures is an uncertainty cost as opposed to the certain monetary cost of the NA 
treatment (see Stevens, 1966, for a useful discussion of this important distinction).   
 The two CA treatments differ with respect to the variance of the underlying 
normal distribution used to generate the settlement X-values in the event of disagreement.  
In CA(30), the impasse outcome distribution has mean of x=500 and standard deviation 
equal to 30.  The other treatment, CA(120) has the same mean but standard deviation of 
120.  So, the settlement outcome is much more uncertain in CA(120) than in CA(30), but 
in NA there is certainty that the entire pie is destroyed at impasse.  In both CA 
treatments, the instructions include a table showing 100 draws from the exact CA 
distribution that would be used in the event of impasse to determine payoffs.  This 
approach is used in Ashenfelter et al, (1992) as an information provision procedure that 
most likely mirrors the way in which bargainers gather information in the field (e.g., from 
seeing a history of previous arbitration decisions or court rulings).  Importantly, this 
procedure also creates uncertainty and leaves ample room for subjects to form divergent 
beliefs about the likely outcomes from impasse (as noted in Dickinson, 2004).  Subject 
always participate in the NA treatment from rounds 6-10, but whether CA(30) or 
CA(120) occur in the initial rounds 1-5 varies across subject groups.  All subject pairs 
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play all five rounds of each treatment consecutively prior to new instructions appearing 
on the screen to inform them of the treatment changes. 
 Beliefs are elicited prior to each round of bargaining in both CA treatments.  
Subjects are prompted on-screen to input their belief or expectation about the average 
outcome they feel they would get if the dispute settlement procedure were used.  It is 
made clear that their response does not imply that they will have to use the dispute 
settlement procedure; voluntary settlement is always allowed at any point during the 
bargaining round or at the final offer stage if xb≥xs.  Subjects are given a small financial 
incentive to provide unbiased responses.  One round is randomly selected at the end of 
the experiment, and a subject belief response in the selected round is rewarded with a $2 
payoff for accuracy—within 10 units of x above or below the true average of the dispute 
settlement distribution (i.e., a belief response in the interval [490,510]).  The use of a 
randomly selected belief at the end of the experiment is also meant to minimize any 
potential wealth effect of the belief elicitation procedure on bargaining outcomes.   
 As designed, stage 1 and stage 2 of the experiment elicit risk attitude and beliefs 
in two distinct environments.  Wakker (2004) develops a decomposition rule to elicit 
utility, decision weights, and beliefs in a way that is operationalized in a single 
experiment environment (Abdellaoui et al., 2005).  However, their approach remains 
abstract and not amenable to a bargaining experiment.  If we only conduct the stage-two 
bargaining experiment, it is unclear how one would separate risk attitude and uncertainty 
beliefs.  We therefore estimate an independent measure of risk attitude for each subject 
prior to the uncertainty bargaining experiment. 
Results 
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 Sixty-three pairs of bargainers participated in the 15-round experiment described 
above.  The experiment was finished within an hour, and the average subject payoff was 
$13.50.  Figures 1-3 plot out the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of subject risk 
preferences and beliefs.  In Figure 1, the CDFs of risky choices, which proxy for subject 
risk attitude, are plotted against the CDF that would result from risk neutral subject 
choice (i.e., the risk-neutral subject would choose exactly six “risky” (and four “safe”) 
choices in the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery choice experiment).  One can test for 
differences in the buyer versus seller CDF using the Smirnov test for two-sample 
differences, which assumes that the distributions are independent.  One fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of no difference in the buyer and seller CDFs (p>.10 for the two-sided 
test), but one rejects the null hypothesis that each of these CDFs is equal to the risk-
neutral benchmark CDF (p=.10 in each case for the one-sided test against the alternative 
hypothesis that the risk neutral CDF lies below the buyer or seller CDF).  However, the 
median buyer and seller are both risk-neutral.  Though we do find evidence of risk 
aversion, on average, the sample subjects are not highly risk-averse.12   
 Figures 2 and 3 show the belief-CDFs for buyers and sellers in the low-variance 
treatment, CA(30), (Figure 2) versus the high variance treatment (Figure 3).  The unit of 
observation in these figures is a subject’s average belief, with respect to likely impasse 
outcome, over the five treatment rounds.  The results are similar when using each 
individual belief as the unit of observation, but averaging over the five treatment rounds 
creates sixty-three independent blocks of observations.  This allows appropriate use of 
                                                 
12 The average subject risk aversion parameter, r, in Holt and Laury (2002) is in the r=.3 to r=.5 range (in 
their assumed expected utility framework).  For comparison, average risk aversion parameters in this 
experiment are buyer r=.23 and seller r=.12.  Our subjects are still estimated to be risk-averse, although 
somewhat less so than the subjects in Holt and Laury. 
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the Smirnov full-sample test to examine the distributions of buyer and seller beliefs.  In 
the low-variance treatment one fails to reject the hypothesis that buyers have unbiased 
beliefs (p>.10)—this is tested against the unbiased benchmark that subjects always expect 
x=500.  However, using a binomial test for the number of instances where beliefs are 
optimistic versus unbiased or pessimistic, one rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that buyers are optimistic (p=.05).  For sellers, the Smirnov test 
rejects the null hypothesis of unbiased beliefs in the low-variance treatment in favor of 
the alternative hypothesis of seller optimism (p=.01), as does the binomial test (p=.10).  
One fails to reject the null hypothesis that the seller belief distribution is no different 
from the buyer distribution using the Smirnov test in the CA(30) treatment (P>.10).  This 
indicates that optimism for the bargaining pair is not statistically significant in the low 
variance treatment. 
 In the high-variance treatment, CA(120), one rejects the null hypothesis of 
unbiased beliefs against the alternative of optimism for sellers but not for buyers using 
the Smirnov test (p>.10 for buyers, p=.01 for sellers).  However, with the binomial test 
one finds support favoring the alternative hypothesis of optimism for both buyers and 
sellers (p=.01 in both cases).  Using the Smirnov test, the seller belief distribution lies 
significantly beneath the buyer distribution (p=.01) in the CA(120) treatment—this 
indicates significant optimism for the bargaining pair in the high variance treatment. 
In short, optimism is present in the data, and the nonparametric tests (as well as 
the pattern of the CDFs in Figures 2 and 3) indicate that subjects are more optimistic in 
the CA(120) treatment than in the CA(30).  The summary data show that the average 
buyer belief of the likely impasse outcome in CA(30) is x=483, but in CA(120) it is 
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x=467.  For the sellers, the average belief is an impasse outcome of x=518 in CA(30) and 
x=537 in CA(120).  As a whole, the data are supportive of the hypothesis that bargainers 
tend towards being optimistic towards outcome uncertainty, and their optimism is greater 
when the decision environment is more uncertain.13   
4.1  Dispute Rates 
Average dispute rates across all bargaining pairs for each treatment are NA 
(18%), CA(30) (57.7%), and CA(120) (61%).  If one calculates average dispute rates for 
a bargaining pair in each five-round treatment, then one can examine treatment effects as 
a matched pairs sample with N=63 independent observations.  Using the matched pairs 
(signed rank) test, one rejects the null hypothesis of equal average dispute rates in 
comparing the NA treatment to the CA(30) (p<.01) and CA(120) (p<.01) treatments in 
favor of the alternative hypothesis that disputes are significantly higher in the arbitration 
treatments.  Though average dispute rates are higher in CA(120) than CA(30), one fails to 
reject to null hypothesis of equal average dispute rates when comparing CA(120) to 
CA(30) (p=.21).  I next turn to a more thorough econometric analysis in order to 
disentangle the effects of treatment, beliefs, and risk attitude from the data. 
The data set includes a total of 945 observations when considering each round of 
bargaining by each subject-pair.  Of course, since bargaining pairs are fixed for the entire 
15-round experiment, the data across rounds are not likely to be independent of one 
another.  In order to take this into account, all of the estimated models use a random 
effects specification to deal with pair-specific heterogeneity and correlation of error terms 
                                                 
13 We also find that there is no significant correlation between a subject’s average belief and the number of 
safe choices in the stage-one experiment (=.08 for buyers and = -.10 for sellers).   
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across rounds by a given bargaining pair.  In addition, history variables that describe the 
experience and dispute history of the pair in the experiment are included. 
Table 1 shows estimates of a random-effects probit model.  Dispute is coded as 
equal to one if the bargaining pair utilizes the dispute settlement procedure at the end of 
the round (NA or CA).  Recall that if the round ends with no agreement but the subjects’ 
final offers criss-cross (i.e., xb ≥ xs), then this is coded as Dispute equal to zero—a last-
chance settlement is achieved.  Model #1 is a simple treatment effects model—NA is the 
omitted reference treatment—with additional experience variables Round=1-15 and 
Dispute History=1-14.  Round captures the potential effect of general experiment 
bargaining experience or learning, while Dispute History Ratio measures the distinct 
effect of bad history as proxied by the number of previous rounds of dispute, relative to 
the total, in which the bargaining pair has engaged.   
The estimated marginal effects in Model #1 indicate that there is a significant 
Round effect, but no significant effect of bad bargaining history as measured by Dispute 
History Ratio—this result is robust across all models in Table 1.  In Model #1 disputes 
are significantly more likely in either of the CA treatments compared to NA, which 
replicates results from previous experimental research (e.g., Ashenfelter et al., 1992; 
Bolton and Katok, 1998; Dickinson, 2004) and from field data results comparing dispute 
rates when arbitration is used to those when labor strikes are used—strikes are 
comparable to the high cost of dispute in the NA treatment (see Currie and McConnell, 
1991).  The marginal increase in dispute rates over the NA treatment is significantly 
higher in CA(120) than in CA(30) (p=.05 for the Wald test of the linear coefficient 
restriction on the two treatment variables).  Unlike the results in Ashenfelter et al., 
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(1992), I find evidence that disputes are more likely when outcome uncertainty is higher.  
Significantly, this is opposite the conventional wisdom articulated in Stevens (1966) and 
modeled in Farber and Katz (1979), where arguments are made in favor of higher 
outcome uncertainty in order to promote more voluntary settlements—these arguments 
count on bargainer risk aversion, but they do not consider belief-optimism. 
Model #2 and #3 results in Table 2 attempt to estimate any independent belief 
and/or risk attitude effects that are not controlled in the Model #1 analysis.  Specifically, 
Model #2 adds a control for pairwise beliefs, Belief Difference, (seller minus buyer 
expectation of likely x-outcome at impasse)14, and Model #3 then adds additional 
controls for bargainer risk attitude by utilizing the subject’s number of safe choices, Risk 
aversion parameter, from the stage-one experiment as a proxy for risk aversion.  Risk 
aversion is also interacted with the high variance CA(120) treatment—the latter is based 
on the comparative static predictions from the Farber and Katz (1979) framework.15  The 
results from Models #2 and #3 indicate that beliefs significantly alter the likelihood of 
dispute, but risk attitudes do not—perhaps due to relatively weak risk aversion of the 
subjects.  A bargaining pair that is optimistic (Expectations Difference>0) significantly 
increases the likelihood of dispute, and this effect is robust to the addition of risk 
preference controls in Model #3.   
                                                 
14 This particular coding implies that beliefs are identical in the NA treatment, where beliefs were not 
elicited.  Belief Difference is coded as equal to zero for all rounds of the NA treatment where the impasse 
outcome is known with certainty to be a zero payoff. 
15 None of the results differ if one instead uses the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion coefficients in place 
of  the number of safe choices as the risk attitude control.  It is noted previously that use of the number of 
safe choices controls for risk attitude independent of the chosen theoretical framework. The author thanks 
an anonymous reviewer for suggesting to use ‘safe choices’ as a framework-independent risk attitude 
variable.  The empirical analysis is therefore more general than the theoretical framework used to highlight 
the intuitive hypotheses in Section 2. 
 18
Though the magnitude of the marginal effects on CA(30) and CA(120) do not 
differ much across Models 1-3, together they show that dispute rate differences in 
CA(30) and CA(120) are captured by the risk attitude and beliefs variables.  In other 
words, once controls are added for beliefs and risk preferences, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the likelihood of dispute in CA(30) versus CA(120)—the Wald 
test of this linear restriction is highlighted at the bottom of Table 1.  This is precisely 
what one would predict given that the two CA treatments present the bargainers with a 
mean preserving spread for the uncertain impasse outcome distributions.  The inclusion 
of risk attitude and belief variables in Model #3 imply that the pure CA treatment effects 
estimated are those for a risk-neutral and unbiased bargaining pair, which theoretically 
should not differ in dispute likelihood across any two CA treatments with identical 
average payoff outcomes.  
4.2  Final Bargaining Positions and Settlement Outcomes 
 Though dispute rates are the most commonly used measure of a dispute settlement 
procedure’s success, final bargaining positions are of significance as well.  Final 
bargaining positions, Pb and Ps, for the buyer and seller, respectively, are assumed to be 
functions of the certainty equivalents Xb,R and Xs,R from Section 2.  Most logically, we 
theorize that 0
,



Ri
i
X
P
for i=b,s.   In other words, theory would predict that final 
bargaining positions are positively related to beliefs of likely x-outcomes at impasse, and 
bargaining positions are predicted to increase (decrease) in the risk aversion of the buyer 
(seller).  Final bargaining positions at impasse—perhaps a measure of the aggressiveness 
of the bargainer—can be a useful measure of how close the pair was to agreement.   
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 The results in Table 2 show random effects GLS estimates of a buyer and seller 
final bargaining position model—Lagrange multiplier tests favor use of random- or fixed-
effects over a classical regression model.  The dependent variable in this case, Final 
Bargaining Position, is coded as follows:  when the round ends in dispute, Final 
Bargaining Position is equal to the subject’s submitted final offer.  When the round ends 
in voluntary settlement, Final Bargaining Position is equal to the settlement x-value.  I 
therefore utilize the entire sample of treatment rounds (63 pairs times 15 rounds—
N=945) in estimating the separate models for buyers and sellers.  All independent 
variables are as described before with the exception of Beliefs in the NA treatment.  The 
dispute rate probit model (Table 1) codes the pair’s belief difference as zero in NA, but it 
is not appropriate to code individual expectations as zero in NA.  While the pair is 
logically assumed to have identical beliefs of zero payoffs at impasse in NA, a zero 
payoff maps to a different x-outcome for buyers and sellers.  Beliefs are meant to elicit 
what x-value (not what payoff level) the bargainer feels she is likely to get from the 
dispute resolution mechanism.  As a result, because buyer payoffs are zero at x=700, 
buyer beliefs are coded as equal to 700 in the NA treatment.  For the same reason seller 
beliefs are coded as equal to 300 in NA.   
 The results from Table 2 confirm the belief hypothesis, but not the risk attitude 
hypothesis.  The Beliefs variables indicate that final offers are significantly positively 
related to beliefs of the likely impasse outcome in the CA treatments.  That is, optimism, 
which implies a higher (lower) belief for the seller (buyer) causes final bargaining 
positions to diverge.  Though risk attitudes affect final bargaining positions in the 
direction one would predict, the effects are not statistically significant.  Only in the buyer 
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equation are Round and Dispute History Ratio significant, indicating buyers moderate 
final offers as experience is gained and when their cumulative dispute ratio is higher. 16   
Because beliefs and risk attitude are theorized to affect the boundaries of a 
bargaining contract zone, they are also predicted to affect settlement outcomes.  Table 3 
shows estimates of a model of voluntarily-negotiated settlements in the sub-sample of 
rounds ending in agreement (N=515).  Given that voluntary settlement outcomes are a 
selected sample, I report results that correct for possible sample selection bias alongside 
the uncorrected random-effects estimates.17   
As predicted by theory, settlements outcomes are positively related to the 
bargaining pair’s average beliefs, though not significantly so in the non-sample-selection 
corrected model.  Also, risk aversion significantly worsens the settlement outcome for the 
seller, which is consistent with theory.  There is no significant difference in estimated 
settlement values across the two CA treatments, which is what one would predict once 
having controlled for beliefs and risk preferences.  This alternative approach to 
estimating belief and risk attitude effects provides our only evidence that the risk 
attitudes of our subjects affect bargaining outcomes independent of belief-uncertainty. 
In sum, the analysis indicates that optimism significantly increases the likelihood 
of dispute, it causes final bargaining positions to diverge, and it seems to influence 
settlement outcomes.  The effects of risk attitude are not as conclusive or strong as the 
                                                 
16 The bargaining position convergence result may be considered spurious due to the particular coding of 
final bargaining positions (i.e., agreement codes final bargaining position as equal to one another, and so 
optimism, which increases dispute rates, will generate some final offer divergence with this coding).  
However, utilizing only the selected sample of disputed outcomes (N=430) does not alter the result that 
optimism causes final bargaining position divergence.  These results, available on request, include a 
correction for sample selection—the sample selection terms are significant in both the buyer and seller 
equations at the p=.10. 
17 The model test (F-test) is significant for the Heckit model, and the Lagrange multiplier test indicates a 
random- of fixed-effects model is more appropriate than a classical regression in the one-stage model. 
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estimated belief-effects.  Risk aversion, as proxied by the number of safe choices in the 
stage-one experiment, does not significantly influence dispute rates or bargaining 
positions, but there is some evidence that it harms one’s settlement outcome.18 
5.  Discussion/Conclusion 
 Risk preferences and bargainer beliefs are two of the most commonly considered 
factors affecting bargainer behavior.  Empirical studies have typically examined one or 
the other in evaluating bargaining outcomes.  This is significant given that there is an 
identification problem inherent in evaluating outcomes from many bargaining 
environments with uncertain impasse outcomes.  For example, given that the effects of 
belief-optimism are shown to counteract some of the predicted effects of risk aversion, 
the outcomes from risk-averse yet optimistic bargainers may be empirically 
indistinguishable from outcomes generated by risk-neutral and unbiased bargainers (or 
risk-loving yet pessimistic bargainers).   
 This paper presents results from an experiment designed to separate the 
independent contributions of naturally-occurring beliefs and risk attitude in bargaining 
outcomes.  Subjects participate in a two-stage experiment.  Stage one is the lottery choice 
experiment of Holt and Laury (2002), utilized to generate an estimate of subject attitudes 
towards pure risk.  The second-stage experiment is a bargaining experiment that matches 
subjects in a zero-sum bargaining game for a series of rounds with different degrees of 
uncertainty surrounding the impasse or disagreement outcome.  In the second-stage, 
probabilities over disagreement outcomes are not well-defined, as is likely the case in 
most naturally-occurring bargaining environments.  In the CA treatments, a random 
                                                 
18 If one replaces ‘safe choices’ with a risk-aversion parameter, which assumes an expected utility 
framework, then we find that the seller final bargaining position moderates for more risk-averse sellers, 
which is consistent with theoretical predictions outlined in Section 2 (results available on request). 
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number generation process determines the outcome at impasse, and subject beliefs are 
elicited at the beginning of each CA round.  Though subjects may be optimistic or 
pessimistic about other factors related to bargaining (e.g., relative bargaining skills), the 
beliefs I elicit are clearly aimed at measuring expectations of likely impasse outcomes.   
 The results are consistent with the prevailing wisdom that the average subject is 
risk-averse, yet forms optimistic beliefs under uncertainty.  This, in and of itself, implies 
that an unbiased estimate of the effect of risk attitudes or optimism on bargaining 
outcomes will be difficult to acquire without measures of both to include in the data 
analysis.  The analysis summarized in Tables 1-3 shows that optimism significantly 
increases the likelihood of dispute, significantly increases the divergence of final 
bargaining positions, and significantly alters voluntary settlements (in the direction 
favoring the more optimistic bargainer).  The effects of risk aversion are not as 
ubiquitous, though when present they consistent with theory.  Risk aversion does not 
significantly affect dispute rates, but voluntary settlement outcomes are biased in favor of 
the less risk-averse bargainer (i.e., the buyers) in these experiments.   
 The importance of these results is highlighted by the potential for drawing false 
inference from the data.  Had these (unstructured) bargaining experiments not measured 
risk attitude or beliefs, the results might be casually interpreted as indicating that subjects 
are risk-loving, because disputes occur more frequently when impasse outcome 
uncertainty is highest.  However, the experimental design allows us to identify that 
subjects are, in fact, risk-averse yet optimistic.   
The result that optimism and risk aversion are simultaneously present is important 
to consider in designing a laboratory decision experiment and interpreting its data.  That 
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the effects of optimism are estimated to dominate those of risk aversion has significant 
implications in terms of optimal dispute settlement design.  While outcome uncertainty 
has been considered a useful way to promote voluntary settlement (Stevens, 1966), 
outcome uncertainty is shown to foster the growth of optimism—optimism is worse in 
CA(30) than CA(120).  The design of dispute settlement institutions aimed at promoting 
voluntary settlement might therefore be improved by limiting outcome uncertainty in 
order to limit the potential for optimism to influence bargaining outcomes.  This is 
contrary to what has previously been argued in the literature, but it results from the fact 
that optimism may harm the likelihood of voluntary settlement more than the typical 
level of risk aversion helps it.  A reduction in optimism would also increase convergence 
of final bargaining positions, which may help increase the quality of bargaining 
relationships even when disputes occur.  
 At this point, it is unclear whether the same relative effects of risk aversion and 
optimism would occur in higher stakes and/or naturally-occurring bargaining 
environments.  Holt and Laury (2002) provide some evidence that risk aversion is larger 
for higher stakes gambles, which would counteract some of the optimism effects.  
Babcock et al. (1996) provide evidence that even experienced negotiators in naturally 
occurring setting (i.e., public school teach negotiations) possess a self-serving bias in 
how they view relevant information.  So, it is unclear whether optimism would decline in 
importance simply by raising the stakes of the game, or by placing bargainers in a natural 
field context.19  These are clearly two useful extensions of this research that would help 
clarify the boundaries of the results.  
                                                 
19 Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) provide evidence indicating that optimism as to one’s skills relative to 
others is more prevalent when tasks are perceived as simple and familiar.  If their results can be applied to 
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bargaining situations, then one would predict relatively more optimism for experienced versus novice 
bargainers. 
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Table 1 
DISPUTE RATE MODELS  
Dependent variable=Dispute (random-effects probit estimates) 
N=945 
  
MODEL #1 
 
MODEL #2 
 
MODEL #3 
 
Independent Variable 
Marginal effect 
(st. error) 
Marginal effect 
(st. error) 
Marginal effect 
(st. error) 
Constant -.29 (.05)*** -.29 (.05)*** -.20 (.18) 
CA(30) .42 (.04)*** .39 (.04)*** .40 (.04)*** 
CA(120) .48 (.04)*** .45 (.04)*** .41 (.15)*** 
Belief Difference --- .0005 (.0003)** .0005 (.0003)** 
Buyer risk aversion --- --- -.03 (.02) 
Seller risk aversion --- --- .01 (.03) 
Buyer risk aversion*CA(120) --- --- .02 (.02) 
Seller risk aversion*CA(120) --- --- -.01 (.02) 
Round -.007 (.003)*** -.008 (.003)*** -.007 (.003)** 
Dispute History Ratio -.02 (.07) -.02 (.07) -.02 (.08) 
Wald test()--2 5.57** 3.95** .01 
% correctly predicted 67% 67% 66% 
*,**,*** represent significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively, for the two-tailed test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
FINAL BARGAINING POSITION EQUATIONS 
Dependent variable=Final Bargaining Position 
(Random effects specification) 
N=945 
 Buyer Equation Seller Equation 
Independent Variable Coeff. (st. error) Coef. (st. error) 
Constant 306.15 (39.70)*** 485.31 (25.22)*** 
CA(30) 28.08 (12.66)** -17.09 (12.63) 
CA(120) 40.22 (22.01)* -13.93 (20.07) 
Belief .21 (.05)*** .15 (.05)*** 
Risk aversion 1.88 (3.88) -5.76 (3.82) 
Risk aversion*CA(120) -4.05 (3.75) 3.57 (3.46) 
Round 1.40 (.58)** .20 (.57) 
Dispute History Ratio 31.36 (10.14)*** -6.37 (10.30) 
*,**,*** represent significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively, for the two-tailed test 
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Table 3 
X-VALUE MODELS 
Dependent variable=Agreement X-Value 
Subsample of voluntary agreements (N=515) 
 
 
 
Independent Variable 
Two-Stage Heckita
 
Coefficient 
(st. error) 
Random effects model
 
Coefficient 
(st. error) 
Constant 434.91 (65.53)*** 45246 (65.23)*** 
CA(30) 10.60 (36.80) 2.61 (8.67) 
CA(120) 54.87 (62.54) 39.65 (44.64) 
Average Belief (of bargaining pair) .22 (.11)** .16 (.11) 
Buyer Risk Aversion  -4.48 (3.90) -2.54 (4.19) 
Seller Risk Aversion -8.30 (2.95)*** -8.20 (3.90)** 
Buyer Risk aversion*CA(120) -5.17 (6.81) -5.55 (6.27) 
Seller Risk aversion*CA(120) -5.26 (6.81) -2.75 (6.32) 
Round 1.29 (1.27) 1.12 (1.00) 
Dispute History Ratio 6.72 (12.91) 6.93 (15.90) 
Lamba (sample selection term) -8.14 (54.41) --- 
aThe first-stage probit in this model is model #3 from Table 1 (where the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable Settlement=1 when Dispute=0 and Settlement=0 when Dispute=1). 
*,**,*** represent significance at the .10, .05, or .01 level, respectively, for the two-tailed test 
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APPENDIX A:  Text of experimental instructions (shown on screen in lab) 
Samples of screen-shots included in instructions can be viewed at 
http://www.appstate.edu/~dickinsondl/instructions.html  
 
General Instructions: Player A (Player B) 
 
 This is an experiment in decision-making.  Please read the following instructions 
carefully.  The amount of money that you earn in this experiment will depend, in part, on 
your decisions as well as the decisions of the person with whom you will be randomly 
matched. 
 You have been randomly assigned as a Player A (Player B) in this experiment.  
You and a randomly chosen counterpart will be given a fixed amount of time in a 
decision-making round to mutually agree upon the size of a variable, X.   
 
[two-minute time limit announced by experimenter] 
 
Your range of possible X values lies from 200 to 700 (300 to 800) in increments of one 
(this may not be the same range as that for your counterpart).  The value of X at the end 
of the round will determine your cash earnings for that round.  As a Player A (Player B), 
your cash earnings for any given round are largest (smallest) for smaller values of X.  
Similarly, your cash earnings for any given round are smallest (largest) for larger values 
of X.  You will be given a payoff sheet that translates the different values of X into 
earnings in cents.  (Player B earns more for larger values of X).  Please study this payoff 
sheet carefully so that you fully understand how your earnings will vary given the 
different possible values of X. 
 
  [payoff sheets handed out by experimenter] 
 
If you and your counterpart can mutually agree upon the size of X for that round, 
then you can look to your payoff sheet to determine how much you will receive for that 
round.  In a few moments we will discuss what will happen should you and your 
counterpart not be able to come to an agreement by the end of the allotted time. 
Your interaction with your counterpart will only be through the computer 
terminal.  You will never know the identity of your counterpart and your counterpart will 
never know your identity.  You are matched with the same counterpart for the entire 
experiment. 
The next screen will show you the environment in which you will interact with 
your counterpart.  If at any point during the instructions you have a question, please raise 
your hand so the experimenter can help you. 
In your interactions with your counterpart, you will submit your proposal for the 
size of X on this screen 
 
 [sample screen picture] 
 
 To enter a proposal for X, click on the “New Offer” box, enter a proposal for X 
and then hit “Offer”.  Note:  The sample screens are based on player A’s point of view.  
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At this point, Player B will see Player A’s current proposal and may or may not accept it.  
Player B can similarly make proposals that Player A sees in the counterpart’s box at the 
right of the screen.  Suppose that Player B wishes to propose X=600 rather than accept 
Player A’s current offer. 
 
  [sample screen of offer] 
 
 In this example, Player B’s proposal is seen to be X=600.  This is listed as his/her 
current offer.  Player A may accept the current offer at any time by clicking the “Agree” 
button. 
 If you accept the current offer of your counterpart, the round would be over.  You 
may, however, choose to not accept the current offer.  You can update your current offer 
by increasing or decreasing it, and your counterpart can also update his/her offer.  After 
updating an offer, it will be reflected in your offer box.  Only current offers (offers at the 
top of the list) can be accepted.  Even though offers can be updated at any time, it may be 
wise to give the other Player a few moments to either accept your offer or update his/her 
offer. 
 Suppose that you did not accept the proposed offer and you enter another offer. 
 
  [sample screen of a new offer] 
 
 At this point, your counterpart will see your current proposal for 349 [in this 
example] as well as all previous proposals for this round.  However, only X=349 will be 
listed as the current offer.  As such, your counterpart may now choose to either accept 
your proposal or update his/her proposal.  Let’s suppose that your counterpart choose to 
accept your proposal at this point. 
 
  [sample screen of offer acceptance] 
 
Your counterpart has accepted your offer, and so X=349 for that round.  Once the 
round is over, either another round of similar interactions will occur, or instructions will 
follow to indicate the differences in the subsequent round(s).  You will be asked to 
indicate when you are ready to continue with the experiment. 
The computer will keep track of your cumulative experimental earnings and post 
them on your main computer screen.  You will also have a timer on the screen to let you 
know how much time is left in a particular round.  Please take a moment to locate these 
information items on your screen once bargaining begins. 
The next several screens will inform you as to what will happen should you not 
come to an agreement within the time limit. 
 
Treatment Instructions:  NA 
 For the next several rounds, there will be a particular procedure used to deal with 
the possibility that you and your counterpart may not reach an agreement by the end of 
the round.  Should you reach the end of the round without having mutually agreed upon a 
value of X, you will then be prompted for a final offer.  If you and your counterpart’s 
final offers come to agreement, then that is the value of X for the round (if they overlap, 
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then X will be the average of the final offers for that round).  If there is still no 
agreement, then you will both receive $0 for that round.  This does not affect any of your 
previous earnings, nor does it apply to future earnings (future rounds of the experiment).  
It is important for you to understand this rule.  The screen below shows you what you 
would see if the round were to end in this scenario. 
 
  [sample screen of round ending without agreement] 
 
 This procedure of dealing with no agreement at the end of the round will continue 
until you are otherwise notified.  When you have finished the last round of this 
procedure, you will be notified through the instruction boxes on your computer screen.  If 
you have any questions before starting this set of rounds, please raise your hand now.  
Otherwise, click below to start. 
 
Treatment Instructions:  CA 
 For the next several rounds, there will be a particular procedure used to deal with 
the possibility that you and your counterpart may not reach an agreement by the end of 
the round.  Should you reach the end of the round without having mutually agreed upon a 
value of X, you will then be prompted for a final offer.  If you and your counterpart’s 
final offers come to agreement, then that is the value of X for the round (if they overlap, 
then X will be the average of the final offers for that round).  If there is still no 
agreement, the computer will generate a value of X for you.  Some values of X are more 
likely to be chosen than others, but there is a random element to the computer’s choice.  
Whatever value of X the computer randomly generates, that will be the value of X used 
to determine both your and your counterpart’s payoffs for that round.  To give you some 
information about this random number generation procedure, the next screen will show 
you the last 100 values of X generated by the exact same method that will be used in your 
case (should you not reach an agreement prior to the end of the round). 
 These are the last 100 values of X randomly generate by the computer (The order 
in which they are shown is irrelevant).  This should be used to give you an idea of more 
likely and less likely values of X. 
 
[sample 10x10 table of 100 X-values drawn from appropriate high or low 
variance distribution (X-values are rounded to nearest integer)] 
 
Again, if you and your counterpart have not reached agreement by the end of the round, 
you will be prompted for a final offer.  If final offers still do not agree, then the same 
random number generation procedure that generated these 100 values of X will be used to 
determine your value of X for that round.  If you have any questions before starting this 
set of rounds, please raise your hand.  Otherwise, click below to start. 
 
 
 
